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Paula M. Niedenthal 2 and Nancy Cantor 
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Initial nonconscious affective reactions to a target individual may influence 
a perceiver's selection from among descriptively plausible categories with 
which to organize his impression o f  the target. Specifically, a perceiver may 
be more likely to employ a category that is consistent, in affective tone, 
with the tone o f  his affective reaction. Subjects in two studies were exposed 
to photographs o f  faces o f  target individuals. Degree o f  preference for  the 
faces was manipulated, outside o f  subjects" awareness, by varying the state 
o f  pupillary dilation. Participants in Study One reported that verbal descrip- 
tions that characterized positively (compared to negatively) evaluated category 
prototypes were more likely to be descriptive o f  targets with dilated pupils. 
Similarly, participants judged descriptions that characterized negatively (com- 
pared to positively) evaluated prototypes as more likely to be descriptive o f  
targets with constricted pupils. In Study Two, subjects" recall o f  personality 
descriptions that were (evaluatively) inconsistent with their initial affective 
response to the target was superior to their recall o f  descriptions that were 
(evaluatively) consistent with the tone o f  their initial response. The data are 
interpreted as evidence for  the importance o f  nonconscious affective reac- 
tions in guiding the process o f  impression formation. 
Social perceivers frequently respond to others' nonverbal affective cues, even 
those cues to which they are not consciously attending (Schneider, Hastorf, 
& Eltsworth, t979; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Duncan & Niederehe, t974; Ekman, 
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1972; Ellsworth & Ross, 1976; Mehrabian, 1972). A well-known example of 
this is the affective reaction to variations in pupillary dilation. Individuals 
tend to prefer people with dilated pupils (as demonstrated both behaviorally 
and physiologically) and are less inclined toward people with constricted 
pupils. In addition, individuals make positive attributions about people whose 
pupils are dilated and negative attributions about people whose pupils are 
constricted, presumably without knowing that they are doing so (Flade & 
Lindner, 1979; Hess, 1965, 1975; Hicks, Williams, & Ferrante, 1979a, 1979b; 
Stass & Willis, 1967; Tarrahian & Hicks, 1979). 
The importance of automatic, stimulus-based affective reactions in im- 
pression formation has received little attention since cognitive social 
psychologists focused on the affective outcomes  of cognitive operations, such 
as the category-based evaluations that follow social categorization (e.g., Fiske 
& Pavelchak, 1985; but see Zajonc, 1980). This may be an important omis- 
sion. It seems plausible to suspect that an initial nonconscious affective reac- 
tion to a person can guide a perceiver's selection from among available 
descriptive categories with which to organize his or her cognitive representa- 
tion of the person. 
A long history of research has already demonstrated order effects in 
the impact of information (i.e., personality attributes) in the process of im- 
pression formation. Typically, a primacy effect is observed such that the first 
pieces of descriptive information that a perceiver obtains influence the evalua- 
tion of subsequently learned information (Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; Asch, 1946; 
Stewart, 1965). There are good reasons to assume that primary affective reac- 
tions create similar interpretive or inference sets. 
Recent approaches to modeling the representation of social knowledge 
in memory support this contention. Person memory, in particular, is now 
thought to be organized around emotion "nodes" or, alternatively, to be "tagg- 
ed" by affective memory codes (Bower, 1981; Clark & Isen, 1982; Fiske, 1982). 
While studies have demonstrated that retrieval of categorically related "hot" 
material is facilitated by the presentation of semantic primes to the category, 
it is theoretically just as likely that the material can be cued by a reexperience 
of the organizing affect-perhaps in response to something about a target 
person (Bower, 1981; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Lang, 1979). 
This proposal complicates, but is not at odds with, current reformula- 
tions of the impression formation process, such as that described by Fiske 
(1982; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). In Fiske's view, impression formation is 
a two-stage process that starts with the perceiver's attempt to form a cognitive 
representation of a target by comparison of the target's personal attributes 
to those that characterize a familiar social cateogry in memory. If the in- 
dividual seems to be a good representative of a particular category, then that 
classification recruits a "category-based" affective impression. As we have 
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implied, this might not be the whole story. A different type of affect, a 
general, stimulus-based affective response, may also contribute to the 
discrimination of the most suitable person categories in memory. That is, 
the affective quality of one's perception (however nonconscious it is) may 
operate in the initial phases of impression formation to preselect, or at least 
delimit, in terms of their affective tone, the most plausible categories for 
organizing an impression. 
STUDY ONE 
In the first experiment presented here we test this affective feature 
similarity hypothesis. In order to isolate the role of affective reactions in 
guiding social categorization, we manipulated affect by varying the pupillary 
dilation cues of the target stimuli. Pupillary dilation was thus the only basis 
for distinguishing among possible candidates for certain social categories. 
Subjects in Study One were presented with a series of slides of faces 
of  men and women with constricted (negative affect) or dilated (positive af- 
fect) pupils. As they viewed the slides, subjects judged the likelihood that 
descriptions composed of features of  favorably or unfavorably evaluated 
social categories characterized the individuals they saw. We suspected that 
descriptions of the prototypes of favorable categories would be judged as 
more likely to be descriptive of targets with dilated pupils and that descrip- 
tions of the prototypes of unfavorable categories would be considered more 
characteristic of targets with constricted pupils. 
Method 
Materials 
Prototype Categories. Category labels were generated by 10 pretest sub- 
jects, undergraduates at the University of Michigan, who were asked to list 
as many "kinds of people" as they could think of who fit the following 
specifications: feel negatively toward/male, feel negatively toward/female, 
feel positively toward/male, feel positively toward/female. Subjects later 
engaged in an open discussion, led by the experimenter, in which three 
category labels for each combination of evaluation and gender (12 in all) 
were unanimously agreed to be both familiar and consensually evaluated. 
Category labels are presented in Table I. It is important to note that these 
labels, which include affectively "loaded" adjectives, were used only to elicit 
the prototype descriptions described below. Subjects in the final stage of Study 
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Table I. Category Labels for Favorable and Unfavorable Male and 
Female Prototypes 
Category affect 















One were exposed to the descriptions without the category labels. These 
descriptions, then, served to prime the category. 
Prototype Descriptions. Prototype descriptions were derived from the 
responses of  an independent sample of 25 subjects (13 males, 12 females). 
Twelve subjects were run in one session and were asked to list the typical 
behaviors, attitudes and preferences, physical characteristics, and personality 
characteristics of  each of  six of  the person categories f rom among those 
selected for use in the study. Thirteen subjects attended a separate session and 
completed the same task for the remaining six person categories. 
Thirty-six prototype descriptions (three for each category) were con- 
structed by combining one prototypical behavior, one attitude or preference, 
one physical feature, and one personality characteristic into a brief and com- 
prehensible statement. An attribute was included if it had been mentioned 
by at least two subjects. Three naive judges correctly identified the statements 
as descriptive of the appropriate category with 86°70 accuracy, on average. 
Four descriptions (one for each of four category prototypes) that accounted 
for most of  this error were discarded. Samples of  the thirty-two remaining 
prototype descriptions are presented in Table II. 
These same subjects also rated the "typical member" of  each category 
on five dimensions: positivity, attractiveness, intelligence, honesty, and com- 
fortableness. Person categories selected initially as positive concepts for both 
genders were judged significantly more likely to elicit feelings of  positivity 
than the categories selected to elicit feelings of negativity (p's < .01). The 
typical members of the positive categories were also rated more attractive, 
friendly, intelligent, honest, and comfortable than were typical members of 
the negative categories (p's < .01). 
Subjects 
A total of  45 University of  Michigan undergraduates (23 males, 22 
females) participated in Study One. Voluntary experimental participation en- 
titled subjects to partial credit toward a course requirement. 
Affective Responses 























She does charity work, is inventive, has warm, soft 
hands, and supports social programs. 
She blindly observes guidelines, is judgmental, is a 
conservative dresser, and doesn't like excitement. 
He tries to con people into things, is ambitious, wears 
tailored suits, and likes being in the spotlight. 
He spends a lot of time with his wife and kids, is 
humorous, never frowns, and likes to drink beer. 
She goes dancing at night, has a sunny personality, 
stays in shape, and is confident when talking to 
strangers. 
He is into meditation, is not easily offended, is 
physically weak, and believes he has found the 
right way to live. 
She says stupid things in conversation, is absent- 
minded, has a bouncy walk, and likes expensive 
gifts. 
He is driven by a desire for money, is paranoid, is 
unhealthy, and is unconcerned about the future. 
She reads stories to children, is very sincere, speaks 
softly, and likes to lead a slow-paced life. 
He always gets up early in the morning, is 
enthusiastic, makes physical contact when speaking, 
and likes free time. 
He often talks to young people, is empathetic, is 
physically strong, and supports the use of birth 
control. 
She easily avoids noticing people, has a domineering 
personality, rarely shows emotions , and likes 
wealthy people. 
Procedure 
Three to five subjects a t tended each experimental  session. U p o n  their 
arr ival  at the exper imental  room,  subjects were seated approximate ly  6 feet 
in f ront  o f  a projec tor  screen and  were provided with the fol lowing instruc- 
tions: "We are interested in how people form impressions and make inferences 
abou t  other  people. Today  you will see a series of  32 slides of  people's faces. 
Each slide will appear  more  than  once. After  you have viewed each slide for 
ten seconds, I will read a br ief  s ta tement  that  could be descriptive of  the per- 
son in the slide. Your task is to decide how likely it is that  the descript ion 
is in fact t rue of  the person you see." 
After  viewing the slides and  indicat ing their l ikelihood ratings on  scales 
from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely), subjects were debriefed and thanked 
for their par t ic ipat ion.  
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Design 
A within-subjects 2 x 2(Prototype x Affect) experimental design was 
employed. All subjects were exposed to eight stimulus persons four times 
each for a total of 32 exposures. Of the eight stimulus persons, subjects saw 
slides of four persons (two males, two females) whose pupils were (consistent- 
ly) dilated and four persons whose pupils were constricted (Figure 1). Two 
positive and two negative prototype descriptions (without labels) were paired 
with each stimulus person across the four exposures, Thus, all subjects heard 
both favorable and unfavorable descriptions ostensibly descriptive of targets 
with both dilated and constricted pupils. 
Four orders of slide presentation, description-stimulus person combina- 
tion, and pupillary dilation were constructed and counterbalanced across ex- 
perimental sessions. 
Results and Discuss ion  
The design of the present experiment allowed us to test the hypothesis 
that target individuals who elicit positive affect are more likely to be 
Fig. 1. Face of a target individual with dilated and constricted 
pupils. 
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categorized in positive categories whereas targets who elicit negative affect are 
more likely to be categorized in negative ones. Four average likelihood rating 
scores were calculated for each subject: the likelihood that favorable prototype 
descriptions characterized targets with dilated pupils, the fikelihood that favorable 
prototype descriptions characterized targets with constricted pupils, the 
likelihood that unfavorable prototype descriptions characterized targets with 
dilated pupils, and the likelihood that unfavorable prototype descriptions 
characterized targets with constricted pupils. These data were analyzed in 
a 2 × 2(Prototype × Affect) repeated-measures ANOVA. A significant Pro- 
totype × Affect interaction was obtained (F(1, 42) = 18.26, p < .001). In 
planned comparisons, favorable descriptions were rated as slightly more likely 
to be true of  individuals with dilated pupils (M = 4.33) than of individuals 
with constricted pupils (M = 4.08, t(42) = 1.85, p = < .07). Similarly, 
unfavorable prototype descriptions were judged as more likely to be descrip- 
tive of  target individuals with constricted pupils (M = 4.17) than of targets 
with dilated pupils (M = 3.61, t(42) = 4.79, p < .001). 
The findings of the first experiment lend support for the hypothesized 
influence of  initial affective reactions on the use of  social categories. In this 
case, the tendency to represent a person as a member of  a particular social 
category was influenced by the prior manipulation of state of pupillary dila- 
tion, a nonverbal cue to positivity-negativity. Of course, in everyday ex- 
perience, information about the probability of  a person representing a 
member of a given category is constrained partly by context, age, and other 
clues that work to provide the perceiver with general expectations: A party 
guest may expect to see "chic" people when at a party thrown by his more self- 
consciously sophisticated friends. But whether he categorizes a woman with 
a particularly commanding presence as "neurotic and intrusive" or "provocative 
and exciting" may depend on his prior affective reaction to her. Indeed, it 
seems that an individual will judge another person as a "better" member of 
a particular social category if his or her affective response to the target, even if 
outside of  awareness, is consistent (rather than inconsistent) with his or her 
feelings about the category prototype. 
This argument should be distinguished from work on the impact of 
mood on cognitive processes, such as recall of semantic material, problem 
solving, and object categorization (Bower, 1981; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & 
Robinson, 1985; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). The results of  the first study 
demonstrate constraints on categorization posed by the perceiver's response 
to affectively informative properties of the target, not necessarily the effects 
of  the perceiver's current mood per se. In most investigations of  the effects 
of mood on cognitive processing, there is no connection between the infor- 
mation used in the mood induction procedure and the material being com- 
mitted to memory or decision making. Moreover, in the present study, 
subjects were exposed to targets with both dilated and constricted pupils. 
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Mood state is usually thought to last longer than a period of some seconds 
(see Isen, 1984, for a definition of mood state). 
A stimulus-based affect approach to the use of social categories em- 
phasizes the contribution of initial preference responses to successful 
categorization. The affective component of a category may, in some cases, 
be central enough to the essential definition of the concept to be a critical 
diagnostic feature; initial affective reactions to others may prepare the 
perceiver to classify a target in an affectively congruent category. But what 
happens if the perceiver's snap judgment is "wrong"? Another way to test 
the power of initial preferences to guide categorization is to present the 
perceiver with hypothesis-disconfirming evidence. 
STUDY TWO: AFFECTIVE FEATURE DISCREPANCY-EFFECTS 
ON MEMORY FOR DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION 
To set up the problem by way of the previous example, suppose that 
at some level our party-goer experiences the unfamiliar female guest as highly 
approachable. If the experience indeed recruits evaluatively consistent ex- 
pectations, what would happen if a friend confided that this woman was, 
in fact, quite emotionally distant and manipulative, classifying her as 
something of a "sociopath"? 
Past research has shown that when a perceiver receives (semantic) in- 
formation that is inconsistent with a previously instantiated representation 
of a person, he or she relinquishes the category-based representation and 
works with the inconsistencies in formulating a revised impression of the 
target (Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982). 
Since cognitive work is created by the need to make sense of material not 
easily subsumed within an existing category or schema, recall of that schema- 
inconsistent material is very good-typically superior to schema-consistent 
material (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Sentis & Burnstein, 1979). If initial af- 
fective reactions guide the use of affect-laden categories, then we should be 
able to show parallel effects for recall of descriptive information that is 
evaluatively inconsistent (vs. consistent) with the affect-recruited category. 
The strongest interpretation of such a finding would argue that affective 
responses instantiate concepts that can then be contradicted with evaluative- 
ly inconsistent semantic information. A more moderate, and plausible, ex- 
planation follows from data reported by Fiske and Pavelchak (1986). They 
demonstrated that when a target seems to fit an available category, a rapid, 
category-based evaluation is generated by the perceiver. However, if the target 
does not fit any category well, the perceiver must construct an impression 
that is based on a consideration of each attribute known to be true of the 
target. Memory for the characteristics of the target should, therefore, be better 
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when the target does not seem to fit any particular social category. An addi- 
tional way to test the hypothesis that affective reactions guide social 
categorization, therefore, is to compare recall for descriptions of targets who 
evoke initial affective responses that conflict with the evaluative tone of those 
descriptions with recall for attributes of targets who elicit consistent affec- 
tive reactions. Superior recall for features of targets who evoke affective 
responses that are inconsistent with the evaluation of the category described 
by their personal attributes would suggest that the perceiver has already 
generated category-based inferences based on his affective reaction and that 
the inconsistent information has invalidated categorization. 
In Study Two, we measured recall for descriptions of typical members 
of favorable and unfavorable person categories that were ostensibly 
characteristic of target individuals toward whom subjects felt initially more 
or less positively. Subjects were presented with photographs of some of the 
same targets seen in the previous experiment and were asked to complete 
evaluative impression questionnaires about each target. Subjects were then 
unexpectedly asked to evaluate the same targets again. This time the 
photographs were paired with prototype descriptions made up of five features 
that, taken together, primed a prototype of a familiar category that was either 
consistent or inconsistent, in evaluative tone, with the appraisal evoked by 
pupillary dilation. In an unannounced memory test, subjects were asked to 
recall the descriptive information. We expected that when the evaluation of 
a category prototype, evoked by descriptive information, conflicted with the 
perceiver's initial affective appraisal of a social target, then the second evalua- 
tion would be generated in elemental rather than stereotyped mode. We 
predicted, therefore, that recall for items from evaluatively inconsistent per- 
sonality descriptions would be superior to recall of elements of affectively 
consistent descriptions. Affectively consistent information should be 
evaluated in stereotyped affecfive mode and thus be relatively poorly recalled. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 62 undergraduates from the University of Michigan who 
had not participated in the previous experimenL Voluntary experimental par- 
ticipation entitled subjects to partial credit toward a course requirement. 
Materials 
Four- by six-inch black-and-white photographs of the faces of two 
male and two female models (seen in the previous experiments), mounted 
226 Niedenthal and Cantor 
on the right inside panel of 8" x 14" cardboard folders, were used as target 
stimuli. Prototype descriptions were attached to the left inside panel of each 
folder and were covered with slips of 3" × 5" paper that could be lifted to 
allow viewing of the typed information beneath. The descriptions were eight 
prototype descriptions (four positive, four negative; two from each gender- 
specified category) from the 32- original statements constructed for use in 
the prior study. An additional prototypical personality characteristic was add- 
ed to each description so that all descriptions were composed of five feature 
items. For example, a description of a "haughty saleswoman" read: "She is 
friendly only to people like herself, is pushy, is inconsiderate, tries to look 
younger than she is, and likes expensive possessions." (Subjects were not 
shown the category labels.) 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in groups of four and were assigned to "partners" 
according to how they had arranged themselves, side-by-side, at a table upon 
arrival at the experimental laboratory. The ostensible purpose of the study 
was to explore "how people use different kinds of information to form and 
communicate impressions of others." Subjects were told that in the course 
of the experiment they would examine photographs and written descriptions 
of a variety of people, on the basis of which they would complete evaluation 
questionnaires. Next, subjects were erroneously led to believe that the sets 
of partners would exchange packets as part of a communication task later 
in the session. The ostensible communication task would require subjects 
to make inferences about the stimulus persons that the other set of partners 
had seen on the basis of the other partners' evaluation questionnaires. This 
manipulation was included to motivate subjects to form as well-integrated 
impressions as possible (Zajonc, 1960). Finally, each subject was given a large 
envelope and was asked to put his or her evaluation questionnaires inside 
upon completion. 
Evaluation One: Photographs Only 
In the first task, each pair of partners received four folders containing 
the target photographs, and each subject received four evaluation question- 
naires. The evaluation questionnaires elicited subjects' ratings of their feel- 
ings of positivity toward the stimulus persons, and asked how comfortable 
the target made them feel, how likable they thought the target was, and how 
confident they were in their ratings of likability on scales from 1 to 7 (where 
1 = not at all positive, etc., 7 = very positive, etc.). In addition, subjects 
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provided responses to questions that read "Could this person make you feel: 
angry, afraid, happy, sad, excited, relaxed, disgusted, content, frustrated?" 
(where 1 = not at all likely and 7 = very likely). 
Subjects opened the folders and viewed the photographs contained in- 
side one at a time. They were given exactly 1 minute to examine the 
photograph and complete the evaluation questionnaire. When this process 
had been repeated four times, subjects were asked to return the closed folders 
to their original positions on the table in front of them. 
Evaluation Two: Photographs and Prototype Descriptions 
In the second task, subjects viewed the same four target individuals they 
had evaluated in the previous task. This time, however, subjects were asked 
to form their impressions on the basis of the faces in combination with the 
information on the left inside panel of the folders. Subjects read the descrip- 
tions for 10 seconds, closed the cover slip, and were allotted 1 minute in which 
to complete the evaluation questionnaires (identical to those seen in the first 
task) for their second evaluations. Photographs remained visible during the 
1-minute interval. 
Recall of Prototype Attributes 
Finally, subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall the person descrip- 
tions seen in the previous task and to be as accurate as possible in recalling 
the sense and the wording of the information. Subjects opened the folders 
again, viewed only the target photographs for I0 seconds each, closed the 
folder, and attempted to write as many items from the descriptions as they 
could remember within a 30-second interval. 
Upon completion of the third task, the experimenter announced that 
the experiment was over and apologized for leading the subjects to expect 
a final communication task. Subjects were then thoroughly debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Design 
A within-subjects design was used. All subjects saw one stimulus per- 
son who represented an instance from each of the follovdng prototype descrip- 
tion/affect combinations: favorable description plus positive affect, i.e., 
dilated pupils (favorable-consistent); favorable description plus negative af- 
fect, i.e., constricted pupils (favorable-inconsistent); unfavorable prototype 
description plus negative affect (unfavorable-consistent); and unfavorable 
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prototype description plus positive affect (unfavorable-inconsistent). In order 
to control for possible effects of memory for specific prototype descriptions, 
two different descriptions for each of the above conditions were employed 
and were counterbalanced across sessions. In addition, specific target- 
description combinations were also counterbalanced across sessions. 
Results and Discussion 
Analyses of the primary evaluation questionnaires provide some addi- 
tional support for the pupillary dilation hypothesis (Hess, 1965, 1975; 
Hicks et al., 1979a, 1979b, Stass & Willis, 1967; Tarrahian & Hicks, 
1979). Although all of the graduate student models were perceived 
as relatively likable (M = 5.56 on a 7-point scale), subjects were significant- 
ly more confident of their ratings of likability for persons with dilated (M 
= 5.73) compared to constricted pupils (M = 5.39, t = 2.07, p < .05). 
Analyses of the specific reactions to the faces indicated that subjects thought 
that individuals with dilated pupils (M = 4.91) were more likely to make 
them excited than individuals with constricted pupils (M = 4.40, t = 2.54, 
p < .02). 
Recall items were coded as correct responses if they constituted exact 
or synonymous phrasing and communicated the evaluative tone of the original 
wording. Two judges who were blind to the affect cue (state of  pupillary 
dilation in the associated photograph) scored the memory protocols separate- 
ly; 96% agreement was observed. Final response scores were computed by 
subtracting the number of incorrectly recalled items from the number of cor- 
rectly recalled items. Results of  a 2 × 2(Prototype × Affect) repeated- 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between Prototype and 
Affect,  i.e., state of  pupillary dilation of stimulus individual, (F(1, 61) = 
8.06, p < .01). A main effect of Prototype was also obtained (F(1, 61) = 
21.44, p < .001): Subjects recalled more items from the unfavorable pro- 
totype descriptions (M = 2.124) than the favorable descriptions (M = .949). 3 
The main effect for Affect was not significant. 
Planned comparisons of  recall of  items that characterized a prototype 
evaluated in a manner consistent versus inconsistent with the affective reac- 
tion evoked by state of  pupillary dilation of the target revealed the expected 
results. Subjects recalled more descriptive items from the favorable- 
inconsistent (M = 1.23) than from the favorable-consistent target-description 
3Superior recall for items from unfavorable, compared to favorable, categories probably 
represents a replication of past work on negativity biases (Kanouse & Hanson, t972). 
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Fig. 2. Recall of characteristics of favorable and unfavorable prototypes descrip- 
tive of targets who evoked negative and positive affect. 
combinations (M = .701, F(1, 61) = 3.81, p = .05). Similarly, subjects recall- 
ed more items from the unfavorable-inconsistent (M = 2.209) than from the 
unfavorable-consistent target-description combinations (M = 1.58, F(1, 61) 
= 4.17, p < .05). These results are illustrated in Figure 2. 
In sum, subjects recalled more pieces of  information from a favorable 
description of  a stimulus person if that target generated a negative primary 
appraisal. Similarly, subjects recalled more items from an unfavorable 
description of  a stimulus person who communicated positive affect. It seems 
that descriptive information evoking a prototype that is evaluated in a man- 
ner inconsistent with the perceiver's affective appraisal of  a target 
is processed somewhat differently than is evaluatively consistent information. 
One interpretation of  this pattern of  results is similar to that offered 
in past work on effects of  schema-inconsistent material on memory in im- 
pression formation tasks (Brewer et al., 198I; Sentis & Burnstein, 1979). 
Schema-inconsistent material demands attention and interpretation in order 
to be integrated to form a coherent concept of  another person. Compared 
to schema-consistent information, which is more easily incorporated into a 
preexisting representation, inconsistent material becomes more salient and 
accessible for recall. Similarly, information that is discrepant with a prior 
affective reaction may have to be considered piecemeal in order for an overall 
impression to be formed. The importance of  the present findings is that the 
only basis for a preexisting structure was the initial affective response to the 
target individuals. Although subjects probably had no specific descriptive 
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category in mind, they seemed to be prepared to conceptualize the targets 
as members of certain affect-laden categories and later attended more to in- 
formation that challenged that preparedness. Study Two, in combination with 
Study One, provides converging evidence to suggest that individuals respond 
to affective cues outside their awareness by considering affectively congruent 
social concepts to organize impressions of others. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Do we consider people who evoke negative primary affect as candidates 
for our negative-affect social categories? It seems that we may. Global af- 
fective reactions, even those based on cues transmitted outside of conscious 
awareness, seem to recruit, or delimit, the categories of the "types" of peo- 
ple others may or may not be. The results of Study Two suggest that an in- 
consistency between initial affective impressions and the tone of a semantically 
evoked concept may prevent successful categorization of the target in the 
descriptive category and encourage piecemeal (rather than category- 
based) impression formation. Although these studies do not directly 
test the effects of nonconscious stimulus-based affective reactions on the 
generation of category-based evaluation, taken together, they do provide the 
first step in demonstrating the role of affective responses in the use of 
stereotypes. 
Theorists from Allport (1954) to Fiske (1982) have suggested that 
material in memory becomes associated with "labels of primary potency" or 
summary "affect nodes" through social learning or conditioning. Preferences 
for certain stimulus configurations may, too, be learned or conditioned (out- 
side of awareness) such that automatic affective reactions, generated upon 
encountering another person, may depend on past experience (also see Leven- 
thai, 1974, 1979). For exmple, people who move in an exaggerated jerky, 
nervous fashion could be members of a "mentally ill," "alcoholic," "drug- 
dependent," or "high-jacker" category. After several experiences with peo- 
ple characterized by a lack of smooth muscle control, the sight of an exam- 
ple may invariably evoke an automatic, nonconscious, negative response in 
an observer. This response, in turn, may influence subsequent processing 
of descriptive material. Of course, the stimulus properties that implicate 
negative or positive impressions are probably countless. For example, there 
exists a body of  evidence suggesting that the strength of an individual's at- 
traction to babies is highly dependent upon the shape of the baby's face and 
the configuration of facial features (Hildebrandt & Fitzgerald, 1979; Ster- 
nglanz, Gray, & Murakami, 1977). 
Affective Responses 231 
Regardless of  the stimulus-based origins of  primary response, the find- 
ings reported here suggest that the social observer is prepared to see another 
person as an instance of  one of a set of  affectively laden categories that is 
congruent with the tone of  that response. While these nonverbal cues may 
not evoke a discrete descriptive category, they may still be essential for the 
perception of a "successful" fit between a target and a particular category. 
REFERENCES 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of  prejudice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Argyle, M., & Cook, M. (1976). Gaze and mutualgaze. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 41, 258-290. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. 
Brewer, M. B., Dull, V., & Lui, L. (1981). Perception of the elderly: Stereotypes as prototypes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 656-670. 
Clark, M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Toward understanding the relationship between feeling 
states and behavior. In A. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.), Cognitive socialpsychology. New 
York: Elsevier North-Holland Press. 
Duncan, S. D., & Niederehe, G. (1974). On signalling that it's your turn to speak. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 10, 234-247. 
Ekman, P. (1972). Universals and cultural differences in facial expressions of emotions. In J. 
Cole (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Ross, L. (1976). Intimacy in response to direct gaze. JournalofExperimentat 
Social Psychology, lt, 592-6t3. 
Fiske, S. T. (1982). Schema-triggered affect: Applications to social perception. In M. S. Clark 
& S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Cognition and affect: The 17th annual Carnegie symposium~ 
HiUsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
Fiske, S. T., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based affect response: 
Developments in schema-triggered affect. In R. M. SorrentJno & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), 
The handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Flade, A., & Lindner, G. (1979). Die Rolle der Pupillengrosse bei der Wahrnehmung von Per- 
sonen. Zeitschrift ffir Experimentelle und Angewandte Psychologic, 26(3), 436-447. 
Hamilton, D. L., & Zanna, M. P. (1974). Context effects in impression formation: Changes 
in connotative meanings. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 649-654. 
Hastie, R. (1980). Memory for behavioral information that confirms or contradicts a personality 
impression. In R. Hastie, T. M. Ostrom, E. B. Ebbeson, R. S. Wyer, D. L. Hamilton, 
& D. E. Carlton (Eds.), Person memory: the cognitive basis of  perception. Hillsdale, 
New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
Hastie, R., & Kumar, P. A. (1979). Person memory: Personality traits as organizing principles 
in memory for behavior. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 25-38. 
Hemsley, R., & Marmurek, P. (1982). Person memory: The processing of consistent and in- 
consistent information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 433-438. 
Hess, E. H. (1965). Attitude and pupil size. Scientific American, 222(4), 46-54. 
Hess, E. H. (1975). The tell-tale eye. New York: Litton. 
Hicks, R. A., Williams, S. L., & Ferrante, F. (1979a). Eye color and the pupiUary attributions 
of college students to happy and angry faces. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 13(1), 
55-56. 
232 Niedenthal and Cantor 
Hicks, R. A., Williams, S. L., & Ferrante, F. (1979b). Pupillary attribution of college students 
to happy and angry faces. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 48, 401-402. 
Hildebrandt, K. A., & Fitzgerald, H. E. (1979). Facial feature determinants of perceived infant 
attractiveness. Infant Behavior and Development, 2, 329-339. 
Isen, A. M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R. Wyer & T. 
Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
Isen, A. M., Johnson, M. M. S., Mertz, E., & Robinson, G. F. (1985). The influence of positive 
affect on the unusualness of word associations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 48, 1413-1426. 
Kanouse, D. E., & Hanson, L. R. (1972). Negativity in evaluations. In E. E. Jones et al. (Eds.), 
Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learn- 
ing Press. 
Lang, P. J. (1979). Language, image and emotion. In P. Pliner, K. R. Plankstein, & J. M. 
Spigel (Eds.), Perception of emotion in self and others (Vol. 5). New York: Plenum. 
Leventhal, H. A. (1974). Emotions: A basic problem for social psychology. In C. Nemeth (Ed.), 
Social psychology: Classic and contemporary interactions. New York: Rand McNally. 
Leventbal, H. A. (1979). A perceptual-motor processing model of emotion. In R. Pliner, K. 
R. Blankenstein, & I. M. Spigel (Eds.), Advances in the study of  communication and 
affect (Vol. 5). New York: Plenum. 
Mehrabian, A. (1972). Nonverbal communication. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 
Schneider, D. J., Hastorf, A. H., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1979). Person perception. Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Sentis, K. P., & Burnstein, E. (1979). Remembering schema-consistent information: Effects 
of a balance schema on recognition memory. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 317, 2200-2211. 
Stass, J. W., & Willis, F. N. (1967). Eye contact, pupil dilation, and personal preference. 
Psychonomic Science, 7, 375-376. 
Sternglanz, S. H., Gray, J. L., & Murakami, M. (1977). Adult preferences for infantile facial 
features: An ethological approach. Animal Behavior, 25, 108-115. 
Stewart, R. H. (1965). Effects of continuous responding on the order effect in personality im- 
pression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 161-165. 
Tarrahian, G. A., & Hicks, R. A. (t979). Attributions of pupil size as a function of facial valence 
and age in American and Persian children. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, t0(2), 
243-250. 
Teasdale, J. D., & Fogarty, S. J. (1979). Differential effects of induced mood on retrieval of 
pleasant and unpleasant events from episodic memory. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
88, 248-257. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1960). The process of cognitive tuning in communication. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 61, 159-167. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American 
Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
